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CASE NOTES 
Constitutional Law-TRIAL BY JURY-OSHA AND THE SEVENTH AMEND- 
MENT-Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 
OSHD) 7 18,927 (3d Cir. Nov. 4,1974), vacated and rehearing en  banc 
ordered, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTHGUIDE 5939- 13 (Dec. 20, 
1974). 
An employee of Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. (Irey) was killed when the 
trench in which he was working collapsed. As a result of this acci- 
dent, Irey was cited for the violation of various standards promulgated 
pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19701 (the 
Act). At a hearing before an Occupational Safety and Health Ad- 
ministration (OSHA) examiner, Irey was found to have committed 
"willful" violations of the general duty section of the Act2 and of 
certain standards relating to the proper shoring of trenches.3 A 
penalty of $5000 was assessed. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission (the Commission) reviewed the case and af- 
firmed the examiner's report.4 Irey appealed the Commission's ruling 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, challeng- 
ing the constitutionality of various provisions of the Act. The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Irey's constitutional claims but 
remanded the Commission's ruling on the ground that the wrong 
standard had been applied in determining whether Irey's violations 
had been "willful" within the meaning of the Act. Judge Gibbons, 
dissenting, argued that the Act violated the seventh amendment by 
denying the opportunity for a jury trial. Acting on Irey's petition for 
a rehearing, a majority of the judges of the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals vacated the judgment in the instant case and ordered a re- 
hearing en banc. 
I. OSHA AND ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION 
A.  OSHA 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was enacted for 
the express purpose of assuring "so far as possible every working man 
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions"5 
'29 U.S.C. 55 651-78 (1975). 
2The general duty section of the Act requires, in pertinent part, that: 
(a) Each employer - 
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of em- 
ployment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely 
to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees; 
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards . . . . 
29 U.S.C. 5 654(a) (1975). 
3Frank Irey, Jr., Inc., 1971-1973 OSHD 20,412 (1972). 
*Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. 1973-1974 OSHD 21,282 (1973). 
529 U.S.C. 4 651(b) (1975). 
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To achieve this goal the Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to 
promulgate safety and health standards applicable to businesses affect- 
ing interstate c ~ m m e r c e . ~  OSHA is the agency charged with the. 
enforcement of these standards. 
The Act provides for both civil and criminal penal tie^.^ Although 
criminal sanctions can only be imposed following conviction in a 
court: the Act provides that the Commission has authority to  assess 
civil penalties "giving due consideration to the appropriateness of the 
penalty with respect to the size of the business . . . the gravity of the 
violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous 
violations. "9 
Penalties assessed under the Act are to be paid to the Treasury of 
the United Stateslo and if not voluntarily paid may be recovered by 
the United States in a civil action brought in a district court.ll While 
the Act is not clear on this point, the legislative history and accepted 
judicial interpretation indicate that the district court proceeding for 
the collection of OSHA penalties is to be a summary proceeding at 
which the merits of the penalty imposition are not explored.12 
B.  Administrative Proceedings, Civil Penalties, and a Seventh 
Amendment  Right to a Jury Trial 
Federal courts have generally rejected claims of a right to jury trial 
in federal administrative proceedings. In Helvering v. Mitchell l the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a civil fraud provision of 
the Internal Revenue Act was in the nature of a criminal sanction. 
Concluding that the jury trial guarantee of article 111, section 2 of the 
Constitution was therefore inapplicable, Justice Brandeis explained 
that "the determination of the facts upon which liability is based 
may be by an administrative agency instead of a jury . . . . " 1 4  
The second case of note is N L R B  u. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp.15 In that case the Court ordered enforcement of an NLRB 
decree requiring the reinstatement of an employee and an award of 
back pay. Jones & Laughlin argued that it was entitled to a jury trial 
as the award of back pay was the equivalent of a money judgment 
and was therefore subject to the seventh amendment. The Supreme 
Court rejected this claim and held that where an award of monetary 
6Zd. $ 651(b) (3). 
'Zd. $666. 
'Id. $ 666(e), (f), (g). 
91d. $ 666(i). 
'Old. $ 666(k). 
"Id. 
121n the House debate it was stated that this provision should be narrowly construed 
and was intended to be limited to any process which might be necessary to actually 
collect the penalty. 116 CONG. REC. 42207 (1970). 
'3303 U.S. 391 (1938). 
14Zd. at 402. 
15301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
5431 CASE NOTES 545 
relief is merely incidental to an equitable remedy, the proceeding 
need not be tried to a jury.lG That holding has been broadly con- 
strued as meaning that administrative proceedings, in general, need 
not comply with the seventh amendment." 
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the instant 
case for the Commission's reconsideration of the "willfulness" 
issue,18 it did consider and reject all of Irey's constitutional corn- 
plaints.lg Judge Gibbons' dissent,20 however, addressed an issue not 
raised by Irey. The burden of the dissent is that the Act violates the 
seventh amendmenP1 because an alleged violator is denied the 
opportunity for a jury trial determination of the facts upon which a 
money judgment is as~essed.2~ 
Characterizing the proceeding in the instant case as a suit for an in 
personam money judgment, an action at law, the dissent asserted 
that the Supreme Court has never sustained the imposition of such a 
judgment where a defendant requested and was denied his seventh 
amendment right to a jury tria1.23 In reaching this conclusion, Judge 
Gibbons dismissed the government's reliance on Heluering u. Mit- 
chell. Specifically, Judge Gibbons asserted that Justice Brandeis' lan- 
guage was not dispositive of the jury trial issue in the instant case as 
Mitchell dealt only with the right to trial by jury in criminal proceed- 
ings secured by article 111, section 2 of the Constitution and not the 
seventh amendment guarantee of jury trial in civil cases.24 
The dissent also considered several other cases that might be con- 
strued as authority for the denial of Irey's seventh amendment 
right .25 Of particular importance is Judge Gibbons' treatment of 
l6Id. at 48. 
17See, e.g., Justice Marshall's characterization ofJones 6 LQughlin in Curtis v. Loether, 
415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). This characterization of Jones 6 Laughlin is discussed in the 
text accompanying notes 5-1 infra. 
183 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) 7 18,927, at 22,730. 
l91d. at 22,72627. 
201d. at 22,731. 
21U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law. 
223 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) 1 18,927, at 
22,731-35. 
23Zd. at 22,735. 
241d. at 22,734. 
25The cases considered by Judge Gibbons included those arising under passenger 
safety and immigration laws. Judge Gibbons dismissed the precedential value of these 
cases on the ground that they all had dealt with in rem procedures and hence were not 
analogous to the in personam procedure in question in the instant case. Id. at 22,732- 
35. This in rem-in personam dichotomy is discussed in the text accompanying notes 
44-47 infra. 
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NLRB u. Jones & ~aughl in  Steel Corp. The rule espoused by the 
Supreme Court in that case is that where an award of monetary relief 
is merely incidental to an equitable remedy, the proceeding is not in 
the nature of an action at common law and hence the seventh 
amendment is inapplicable.26 Noting that the only relief sought in 
the instant case was the recovery of a money judgment with no 
equitable sanctions involved, the dissent concluded that Jones & 
Laughlin was not c0ntrolling.~7 
In concluding his analysis, Judge Gibbons cited with approval 
another administrative scheme that avoided the seventh amendment 
problem,28 and noted that OSHA could easily provide similar safe- 
g u a r d ~ . ~ ~  Citing Ross u. Bernh~rd,~O a case in which the seventh 
amendment was found applicable to stockholder derivative suits, as 
indicative of the result he would reach, Judge Gibbons concluded 
that "[iln the absence of a case in point in the Supreme Court, I 
prefer to assume that the seventh amendment still has meaning." 3l 
Judge Gibbons' dissent is important for several reasons. First, in 
the instant case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has granted an en 
banc rehearing of the case largely to consider the seventh amendment 
issue.32 Second, similar complaints concerning OSHA's enforcement 
powers have been raised in other Third, the same constitu- 
tional question is inherent in several other administrative schemes. 34 
Finally, the dissent identifies a constitutional basis upon which to 
limit the adjudicatory powers exercised by administrative agencies. 
Judge Gibbons' dissent is thorough and seemingly compels the result 
urged. There are, however, several points that merit closer scrutiny. 
For these reasons, this case note is limited to an analysis of possible 
weaknesses in Judge Gibbons' dissent. 
26301 U.S. at  48. 
273 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) % 18,927, at  22,735. 
28Judge Gibbons quotes L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 113 
(Student ed. 1965), wherein Professor Jaffee extols the virtues of the administrative 
scheme created by the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 8$ 503-04 (1970). 3 CCH 
EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) % 18,927, at 22,736. The 
majority in the instant case also expressed similar reservations about OSHA's adminis- 
trative scheme, indicating that while they found the Act constitutional, a less offensive 
means of administrative adjudication could have been devised. Id. at  22,729 n.11. 
293 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) fl 18,927, at  22,736. 
3O396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
313 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) % 18,927, a t  22,735. 
32For the purposes of the rehearing, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals requested 
that both parties prepare briefi directed to the seventh amendment issue. Letter from 
McNeill Stokes (attorney for Irey) to Roy K. Ross, March 26,1975. 
33Constitutional challenges to OSHA's powers have already been raised in the Courts 
of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing 
at 13, Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 
(1974-1975 OSHD) 7 18,927 (3d Cir. Nov. 4,1974). 
34See 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 948-52 (1972) (Appendix A). 
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A. A n  "Act ion for Debt" 
By its terms, the seventh amendment applies to  "suits at common 
law." The term "common law" is generally interpreted as meaning 
the common law of England as of 1791, the date the amendment was 
adopted.35 This interpretation does not, however, necessarily pre- 
clude the application of the seventh amendment to newly created 
r i gh t~ ;3~  the fact that OSHA did not exist in 1791 does not of itself 
defeat the seventh amendment claim arising out of the Act's enforce- 
ment procedure. However, the claim to  a jury trial will prevail, under 
accepted seventh amendment analysis, only if the newly created 
rights and duties under the Act are closely analogous to those rights 
and duties which were historically enforceable in an action at 
common laws3' 
On this point, Judge Gibbons' characterization of the district 
court proceeding provided for by OSHA as one for execution on an 
in personam money judgment is misleading. Taken literally, such a 
characterization would undermine Judge Gibbons' position that a de 
novo jury trial on the merits of the penalty award should be available 
in the district court proceeding. Technically, a suit for execution on 
an in personam money judgment, though subject to the seventh 
amendment, is limited in scope to a consideration of the existence 
and validity of the judgment. The merits upon which that judgment 
was secured are not open to review by the 
Judge Gibbons' seventh amendment argument would be strength- 
ened by characterizing the Act's collection procedure not as a 
proceeding for execution on an in personam money judgment but 
rather as an action to collect a civil penalty. An action to collect such 
a penalty is equivalent to the old common law "action for debt" 
which was triable before a j ~ r y . 3 ~  And "when a federal statute 
embraces a common-law form of action, that action does not lose its 
identity merely because it finds itself enmeshed in a statute. The 
right of trial by jury in an action for debt  still prevails whatever 
modern name may be applied to the action."40 
Yet the near identity of the Act's mode of penalty recovery with 
the common law action for debt does not necessarily end seventh 
amendment analysis. There is some authority to the effect that the 
seventh amendment does not apply to administrative proceedings in 
general.41 Seemingly anticipating the difficulty this authority may 
35Parsons v. Bedford, 28 US. (3 Pet.) 433,446 (1 830). 
36See 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 38.11 [7] (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 5 
MOORE]. 
37Zd. at 128.4. 
38Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268,275 (1935). 
39See 5 MOORE f 38.11 [7], at 128.2. An action for debt covers, among other causes, 
suits for statutory penalties. See, in addition, Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 
(1909) for Mr. Justice Harlan's treatment of the subject. 
40United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983,986 (D.N.J. 1950) (emphasis added). 
41See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra and notes 55-61 infra. 
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/ 
present to a jury trial claim, Judge Gibbons attempted to distinguish 
the instant case from Helvering- v. Mitchell42 and N L R B  v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel C ~ r p . ~ ~  
B. Helvering v. Mitchell 
Judge Gibbons' rejection of Mitchell's precedential value was 
based on his conclusion that Justice Brandeis' language in that case 
had reference only to jury trial claims arising under article 111, sec- 
tion 2 of the Constitution. A primary ground upon which Judge 
Gibbons based this conclusion was that all cases cited to support 
Justice Brandeis' rejection of the jury trial claim dealt with penalties 
for forfeitures assessed in rem.44 
Yet in rern cases may be appropriate precedent in a case dealing 
with seventh amendment claims. In general terms, the seventh 
amendment right to a trial by jury in civil cases is applicable to all in 
personam actions. It applies also to all in rern proceedings except 
those arising under admiralty or maritime jurisdictions. 45 Accord- 
ingly, cases denying a jury trial for nonmaritime proceedings in rern 
would be persuasive precedent for a like ruling in an in personam 
context. Judge Gibbons' blanket rejection of cases dealing with in 
rern proceedings overstates the in rem- in personam dichotomy. 
Although Judge Gibbons' sweeping rejection of in rern precedent 
is questionable, analysis of the cases cited in Mitchell 46 reveals that 
rejection of those particular in rern precedents was, in fact, appro- 
priate. All those cases arose under admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, 
as defined by the Judiciary Act of 1789,*' and consequently the 
seventh amendment was not applicable to them. Obviously, this fact 
serves to bolster the conclusion that Mitchell's language was not 
directed to seventh amendment claims. 
There is one additional distinction between Mitchell and the 
instant case, not noted by the dissent. The Constitution expressly 
delegates to Congress powers to  legislate in the areas dealt with in 
Mitchell and the cases cited in support thereof. The areas involved 
include internal revenue, alien immigration, and customs assess- 
mentP8 Traditionally, judicial deference to congressionally prescribed 
42303 U.S. 391 (1938). 
43301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
443 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) 7 18,927, at 22,734. 
45See 5 MOORE 138.35 [I], at 269-70. 
46Footnote 7 to Justice Brandeis' opinion reads, in pertinent part: 
Passavant v .  United States, 148 U.S. 214; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. 
Stranahan, 214 US. 320; Elting v. North German Lloyd, 287 US. 324, 327-28; 
Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v .  Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334. 
303 U.S. at 402 n.7. 
47Passavant v. United States involved a dispute over import customs assessment. 
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v .  Stranahan, Elting v. North German Lloyd, and Lloyd 
Sabaudo Societa v. Elting all dealt with fines levied in rern against ships involved in the 
importation of aliens. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,s 9 , l  Stat. 76. 
4%ee note 47 supra. Congress is given authority to raise internal revenue in U.S. 
CONST. art. I, $ 8, cl. 1 and by the sixteenth amendment. Control over immigration is 
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administrative procedures is greatest where the area of legislation is 
exclusively within congressional control. 49 This factor suggests a 
limit to the dictum in Mitchell. 
Examining OSHA in this light, one finds that while Congress 
enacted OSHA pursuant to, or in exercise of, constitutionally dele- 
gated powers,50 occupational safety is certainly not a concern 
expressly delegated to Congress by the Constitution, nor is it an area 
over which Congress has exclusive control.51 These two factors 
clearly distinguish occupational safety from the agencies and laws 
dealt with in Mitchell and the cases upon which it relies. 
In sum, Judge Gibbons' rejection of Mitchell as being dispositive 
of Irey's seventh amendment claim in the instant case seems com- 
pelling on two grounds. First, Justice Brandeis' language is mere 
dictum and not addressed to a seventh amendment challenge. 
Second, the cases upon which Mitchell relied all dealt with areas of 
legislation over which the courts traditionally give Congress great 
deference. 
C. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 
In the instant case, the dissent narrowly confined the reach of 
Jones & Laughlin to its explicit holding that where an award of 
monetary relief is only incidental to  an equitable remedy the seventh 
amendment is inapplicable. 52 Distinguishing Jones 6' Laughlin from 
the instant case, Judge Gibbons noted that no equitable sanctions are 
involved in the OSHA proceedings. 53 
While this reading of Jones 6' Laughlin has been adopted by some 
of the  commentator^,^^ a broader reading of the case is possible. In 
dictum, the Supreme Court gave a broad reading to Jones & Laughlin 
in the recent case of Curtis v. Loether. 55 Justice Marshall, writing for 
based on art. I, 5 8, cl. 4. The power over customs assessment is predicated on art. I, 
$ 8, cl. 1,3. 
%peaking for the Court in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v .  Stranahan, Mr. Justice 
White said: 
In accord with this settled judicial construction the legislation of Congress from 
the beginning, not only as to tariff but as to internal revenue, taxation and other 
subjects, has proceeded on the conception that it was within the competency of 
Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose 
appropriate obligations. . . without the necessity of invoking the judicial power. 
214 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added). See the language immediately following that quoted, 
wherein Justice White explains the rationale behind the constitutional principle. Id. 
at 33940. 
50The Act is predicated on the Commerce Clause and the congressional power to 
provide for the general welfare. 29 U.S.C. $651(b)(1975). 
51The Act takes note of this fact by providing for the interrelationship of state and 
federal regulation. Id. at $ 667. Beyond this, however, occupational safety is of course 
governed and encouraged by the tort law and workmen's compensation statutes that 
exist in every state. 
523 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) 1 18,927, at 22,735. 
531d. 
54See, e.g., 5 MOORE 1 38.08 [5], at 81-82. 
55415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
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the Court, asserted that Jones & Laughlin stands for the proposition 
that "the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in adminis- 
trative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the 
whole concept of administrative adjudication and would substan- 
tially interfere with the NLRB's role in the statutory scheme."56 
Even accepting this broad characterization of Jones & Laughlin, to 
grant Irey, and those similarly situated, recourse to a de novo jury 
trial on the merits when sued for an OSHA penalty would not be 
"incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudica- 
tion." In order to comply with seventh amendment requirements, 
OSHA could make a formal, though legally inconclusive, adjudica- 
tion of liability. An action to recover a penalty so ascertained could 
proceed as currently designed, but with a de novo jury trial on the 
merits available to the defendant. Administrative adjudication would 
still exist with only the finality of such judgments impaired. Such a 
procedure has proven effective for the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC). 57 This fact tends to refute any "incompatible 
with the whole concept of administrative adjudication" argument. 
Similarly, compliance with the seventh amendment would not 
" substantially interfere with [OSHA's] role in the statutory 
scheme." The Act provides OSHA with essentially three roles: a 
quasi-legislative role, 58 an administrative-enforcement role,59 and an 
adjudicatory role.60 Of these three roles, only the third mentioned 
would be affected by allowing for a jury review of the merits upon 
which an OSHA penalty is based. Moreover, the interference with 
OSHA's adjudicatory role would not be severe; it would impair the 
finality of OSHA decisions only by allowing for what is essentially an 
optional appeal to the courts. Further, the FCC's experience 
indicates that such an option is seldom exercised.G2 This interference 
is further minimized by the express holding of Jones BLaughlin that 
equitable remedies may be imposed administratively without resort 
to the judiciary.63 
561d. at 194 (footnote omitted). 
57See note 28 supra. 
5829 U.S.C. 5 655 (1975) (authorization to promulgate safety and health standards). 
59Id. at $5 657-59 (authorization to inspect, investigate complaints, issue citations, 
etc.). 
60Zd. at $5 659-62 (adjudication by the Commission authorized). 
61The procedure postulated here would entail a de novo jury trial only when a de- 
fendant does not voluntarily pay the OSHA determined penalty. Under the Federal 
Communications Act, the Government has never been put to such a suit in order to 
collect a penalty. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 113 (Student 
ed. 1965). 
621d. On this point, the majority in Irey observed: 
[W]e think experience demonstrates rather conclusively that in cases of this 
nature de nmo  review is seldom requested. [Yet] it  is the availability of the 
remedy, not its infrequent utilization which is important to the cause of justice. 
3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) 9 18,927, at 22,729 
n.11 (emphasis added). 
63301 US. at 48. 
55 11 CASE NOTES 551 
Manifestly then, Jones & Laughlin does not control the seventh 
amendment claim arising under the OSHA procedure in question. If 
that case is given a narrow reading, Judge Gibbons' distinction is 
conclusive. Even the expansive test implicit in Justice Marshall's 
characterization of Jones @ Laughlin would not mandate a denial of 
a seventh amendment claim. And, certainly, Jones & Laughlin cannot 
support a holding that all administrative proceedings, including the 
OSHA enforcement procedure, are outside the scope of the seventh 
amendment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Subject to the foregoing clarifications and expansions, Judge 
Gibbons' position clearly represents the current state of the law and 
the best thinking. Accordingly, on rehearing, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals will be forced to deal with Judge Gibbons' conclusion 
with a more sophisticated analysis than was employed by the 
majority in the instant opinion. Hopefully, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals will shun the questionable judicial technique employed by 
the majority in Irey when that panel anticipated the Supreme Court, 
relying on no more than the "thrust" of certain precedents,G4 and 
refused to vindicate a fundamental right. Paraphrasing Judge 
Gibbons, in the absence of a case in point in the Supreme Court, it is 
preferable to assume that the seventh amendment still has 
meaning.65 
Criminal P ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - D I S C O V E R Y - P R E T R I A L  DISCOVERY DEPOSITION IN
UTAH CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS-S tate v. Nielsen, 52 2 P. 2d 1 3 66 (Utah 
1974). 
The defendant, a Logan, Utah, city commissioner, was charged 
with misuse of public funds, a felony, and with a misdemeanor count 
of using his position to secure privileges or exemptions. Four days 
later he served seven Logan citizens with notice that their depositions 
would be taken pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
prospective witnesses were also served with subpoenas duces tecum 
calling for the production of certain documents relating to the 
criminal charges. In response, the state quickly brought an action for 
a declaratory judgment to determine the defendant's right to take 
the depositions. The district court issued an order permanently stay- 
643 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) 7 18,927, at 22,729 
n.11. 
65Zd. at 22.735. 
